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7 Gradual retirement in the 
Netherlands 
Lei Delsen 
The Dutch experience of employment for older workers differs significantly 
from that of other industrialised countries. Relative to most other OECD coun-
tries, the Netherlands are becoming a country of early retirement. Over the 
period 1960-1990, the drop ( 42 per cent) in the Netherlands in the male 
activity rate for the 55-64 age-group has been the sharpest in the OECD. The 
activity rate of older persons (over 50 years) more generally (42 per cent in 
1990) is still one of the lowest in the Eu where the average was about 50 per 
cent in 1990, and that of men 55-64 (46 per cent in 1990) is one of the lowest 
in the OECD. This chapter attempts to explain these divergencies by looking at 
the Dutch macro and micro policies on employment of older workers. The 
aging process in the Netherlands is more marked than in other countries, as 
also are its financial consequences. Future policy options including gradual 
retirement to cope with these problems are discussed. 
7.1 Macro issues and policies 
Recent trends 
Labour market position of older workers 
The proportion of the service sector in total employment (70.1 per cent in 
1991) in the Netherlands is the highest in the EU, while the share of industrial 
employment in the same total is one of the lowest. Over the 1983-1990 period, 
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employment (full-time equivalent) growth in the Netherlands was strong: 1.4 
per cent per annum, which compares with 0.9 per cent in the EU, 1.0 per cent 
in OECD Europe, and 1.5 per cent in the OECD as a whole. Between 1983 and 
1989 service employment growth was 3.9 per cent per annum and that of 
industrial employment 2.5 per cent. New jobs were mainly filled by new 
entrants to the labour market, which is why unemployment rates as well as the 
proportion of long-term unemployment show only a moderate decrease. Most 
of these new jobs were part-time and occupied by women. Since the beginning 
of the 1980s also the volume of temporary employment has increased, the 
volume of atypical employment in the Netherlands being high, relative to other 
European countries (Delsen, 1993). 
Table 7.1 
Labour market position of older work force in the Netherlands, 1989 
Age Dependent employment Self Unemployed Ex-labour Total 
Full-time Part-time employed force 
55-59 43.1 7.7 10.8 3.7 34.7 100.0 
60-64 11.0 3.9 8.7 0.9 75.5 100.0 
Source: Trommel, 1993. 
Age of retirement 
The pension age in the Netherlands is 65 years. However, the effective retirement 
age is much lower and has decreased over the past years from 64.2 in 1960 and 
62.2 in 1980, to 60.3 in 1990 (Besseling, 1994). The Netherlands stand out as 
having a particularly high proportion of male part-time workers in the age-group 
between 55 and 64. The high proportion of part-time employment among older 
male workers aged 60-64 (17.8 per cent in 1985) can partly be attributed to the 
sectoral gradual retirement schemes and, for those aged 55-59 (10.4 per cent 
in 1985), to the reduction under collective agreements of work hours for older 
workers. But for males of 65 years and over the part-time rate is also high (51. 7 
per cent in 1985), as also is the proportion of part-time worked by older (55+) 
women in the Netherlands, relative to other OECD countries. In 1985 it was 70.9 
per cent for females aged 55-59 years, 70.8 per cent for those aged 60-64 and 
64.5 per cent for women of 65 years and over. From table 7.1 it can be deduced 
that in 1989 the proportion of part-time employment was 26.2 per cent for 
employees aged 60-64 and 15.2 per cent for those aged 55-59. The proportion 
of involuntary part-time employment among men aged 55 and over is below 
average and for women aged 55 and over above average, although lower than 
for other age-groups. In general there is a significant positive correlation 
between the level of both female and male labour force participation rates and 
Gradual retirement in the Netherlands 113 
the proportion of part-time employment. In this respect the Netherlands are an 
outlayer (see WRR, 1990; Delsen, 1995). 
Modes of labour exit 
The most important exit routes from the labour process for older persons in the 
Netherlands are the General Disability Benefit Act (AAw) and the Disability 
Security Act (wAo) on the one hand, and the branched-based Voluntary Early 
Retirement (vUT) schemes and the Unemployment Act (ww) on the other. In 
1989, 55 per cent of older workers (55-64 years) used VUT to end employment 
and 32 per cent left for other reasons, mostly disability, with only 13 per cent 
working until retirement age. The situation varies considerably from one 
activity sector to the next (see table 7.2). In building, the low outflow to 
disability can be explained by the fact that such outflow takes place at relative-
ly young ages. But, in any case, in this sector only 3.2 per cent of employees 
are 55 years or older. In the industrial sector and road transport, older workers 
are present in relatively large numbers. The low proportion of VUT in the trade 
and retail sector is related to low vuT provision. The banking and commercial 
services sector is a more complex case, there being no obvious reason for the 
situation that prevails there. 
Table 7.2 
Labour market position of older people (55-64 years) by economic sector 
in the Netherlands, 1989 
Economic Proportion VUT- Exit route from firm(%) 
sector 55+ potential VUT Pension Other 
Industry 6.1 95 54 15 31 
Building 3.2 96 90 1 9 
Trade and retail 4.9 65 45 27 28 
Road transport 6.0 99 66 9 25 
Banks and commercial 
services 4.8 83 48 8 44 
Other services 5.0 92 53 15 33 
Total 5.0 84 55 13 32 
Source: szw, Rapportage Arbeidsmarkt, Den Haag, 1991. 
Proportion 55+: number of employees aged 55-64 years as a percentage of total number 
of employees. 
vuT potential: percentage of employees in a sector able to benefit from a Voluntary Early 
Retirement (vUT) scheme. 
Exit route: VUT- number of persons 55+ that retire early (vuT) as a percentage of the total 
number of employees. · 
Exit route: 'Pension' includes death. 
Exit route: 'Other' - almost exclusively exit to disability (wAo); leaving for another job 
almost never occurs. 
114 Lei Delsen 
The extent of unemployment as a labour exit route is more limited. However, 
table 7.3 shows clear differences between the age classes 50-54, 55-59 and 60-
64 years. The percentage of unemployment among older workers is relatively 
high. In 1991, of those aged 60-64 over 22 per cent were unemployed, com-
pared with only 8 per cent of the total work force. Moreover, the duration of 
unemployment is longer. In 1990, of the older persons in this age class 90 per 
cent were long-term (>12 months) unemployed, compared with 50 per cent of 
the total work force. This is partly because the Unemployment Act (ww) is 
used as an exit route, and the duration ofww benefits depends on the number 
of years worked. But it is in part also attributable to the 57.5 year-rule. Per-
sons aged 57.5 years or older, when they become unemployed, retain their 
right to a follow-up benefit until the first day of the month in which they reach 
the age of 65. As was seen in the respective chapters, similar regulations apply 
in Germany and Sweden. These workers are exempted from the obligation to 
apply for another job. In the Netherlands, perhaps more than in other OECD 
countries, it is difficult for older workers to find work once they have become 
unemployed. Recently the tripartite Board of the Public Employment Service 
(PES) has decided to remove the age criterion from all its training and place-
ment measures. In 1994, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
repealed existing age discrimination in redundancies (de ouderenrichtlijn) used 
to support the Government's policy for increasing the labour market participa-
tion rate. This directive on dismissal of older workers had implied that in cases 
of dismissal on economic grounds, subject to certain conditions, workers of 55 
and older could be shedded first. 
Table 7.3 
Distribution of unemployment (1991) and long-term unemployment (1990) 
by age in the Netherlands 
Age 
<25 years 
25-49 years 
50-64 years 
50-54 years 
55-59 years 
60-64 years 
Total 
Unemployed work force 
(% of work force) 
(1991) 
11.6 
7.2 
10.7 
7.8 
10.6 
22.6 
8.6 
Proportion of long-term 
unemployed (% of all 
registered unemployed) ( 1990) 
28 
55 
76 
73 
80 
90 
49 
Source: szw, Kwartaalbericht Arbeidsmarkt, Derde Kwartaal 1993, Den Haag, 1993. 
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In the Netherlands, the proportion of disability benefit recipients in the work 
force (12.6 per cent in 1992) is the highest in the OECD. Among older workers 
aged 55-64 this proportion is about one third. Unemployment benefits and 
(full) disability benefits, for various reasons, have acted and continue to act as 
substitutes (Delsen and Klosse, 1992). In assessing the degree of disability, the 
prevailing labour market situation was taken into account. This was also true 
of Sweden and Finland. The partially disabled were treated as if they were 
fully disabled, so that almost 85 per cent of all WAO beneficiaries received full 
benefits. In particular, in respect of older workers who have grown less 
productive, disability insurance has provided a convenient way of masking 
lay-offs. Indeed, employers cannot off-load workers without complying with 
redundancy procedures, and employees can count on receiving until their 65th 
year a benefit equal to 70 per cent of their last wage while the duration of 
wage-related unemployment benefit is limited. In 1986 over 50 per cent of 
original beneficiaries in the 55 to 65 age-group were receiving a disability 
benefit, illustrating the fact that the WAO functions as a form of early retire-
ment. Estimates of the size of the hidden unemployment component in disabil-
ity insurance in the Netherlands vary from 15 to 50 per cent of all benefi-
ciaries. Eligibility for disability programmes was made more stringent from 
the middle of the 1980s onwards, and in 1985 benefits were substantially 
reduced. This resulted in a slight increase in the unemployment benefit 
scheme. In 1987 the 'labour market consideration' was removed from disabil-
ity insurance leading to an increase in the volume of partially disabled. 
However, the overall impact of this policy change has been very limited, and 
chances on the labour market are still taken into account (wRR, 1990; Bolweg 
and Dijkstra, 1993). 
In 1987 also the generosity of the unemployment scheme was reduced and 
its eligibility requirements tightened. As a result vur became more popular as 
an alternative to disability and unemployment benefits (Trommel and de 
Vroom, 1994). Originally the temporary VUT schemes were aimed at promoting 
employment for youngsters and improving the well-being of older workers, 
with about one in every three jobs released by the scheme being refilled. 
However, by the end of the 1980s hardly any youngsters were being taken up. 
Not refilling positions opened by vm is clearly a saving for enterprise and, as 
an employer, for the Government. However, for society as a whole the policy 
is an expensive one. In the Netherlands, in actual fact, there is no national 
early retirement scheme. The country's numerous sectoral schemes are based 
on collective agreements. Most of these sectoral vur schemes have the follow-
ing characteristics (Delsen, 1993): the average exit age is 60 years; the benefit, 
which is income tested, is 75 to 80 per cent of the gross final wage irrespec-
tive of the number of years of service; there is a 10-year service minimum for 
elegibility and the schemes operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. Over 85 per cent 
of all employees in the sectors in question are covered by a vur scheme. 
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Between 1983 and 1990, the number of VUT beneficiaries tripled, resulting in 
more than 119,000 participants at the end of 1992. This growth was mainly 
due to a drop in the age-thresholds and to an increase in the number of 
schemes. The average VUT age decreased from 60.2 years in 1986 to 59.8 in 
1993. However, in the last two years of that period, some collective agree-
ments provided for an increase in the VUT age. Moreover, in 1994, in three 
such agreements, the VUT benefit was reduced by 5 per cent-points (DCA, 1994 ). 
Earlier in 1991 and 1992, in a number of agreements, eligibility for VUT was 
extended to include part-timers which as a category had previously been 
excluded. In 1986 total VUT premium was 2.4 per cent of wages, and by 1993 
it had risen to about 3.6 per cent. The premium varied from less than 1 per 
cent in hairdressing, to over 8 per cent in textiles, and 10.5 per cent in the 
dairy industry. Over the same seven-year period, employees' contributions 
increased from 0.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent. Extrapolations of existing trends 
in the number of VUT participants would suggest the following increase: 
147,000 in the year 2000; 213,000 in 2010 and 240,000 in 2020. VUT is 
popular because of the relatively small income loss, the voluntary nature of the 
scheme and the absence of the stigma attached to disability and unemployment 
benefits. 
Until recently, employees had to choose between full exit or full-time 
employment. The provision of part-time employment may reduce the extent of 
the hidden unemployment in the exit routes. It reduces by about one half the 
risk of becoming disabled, and, moreover, contributes to reintegration (Delsen 
and Klosse, 1992; Aarts and DeJong, 1992; Delsen, 1995). In order to make 
early retirement more flexible, sectoral part-time VUT schemes have recently 
been introduced in the metal sector (sUM; svuM) and for employees in archi-
tects' bureaus (suA) as well as in banking (RABO), retail sector (KBB) and care 
sector (PGGM-OBU). Under the RABO and KBB schemes, benefits increase with the 
age of retirement, thus providing an incentive to postpone retirement. In the 
metal sector work time can be reduced and reinstated. osu and suA have two-
step part-time VUT schemes, the latter being upstream of the full VUT schemes 
(Ten Brink and Delsen, 1993). But most of these schemes, set up in 1988 or 
subsequently, were experimental in nature and have since been discontinued, 
and/or replaced by flexible pension schemes (see below). Initiated by 
employers, the main aims of these part-time schemes were to reduce total early 
retirement costs, retain within the firm the knowledge and experience of older 
workers and redistribute employment between young and older workers. 
Conditions are similar to those of the full VUT schemes. However, in contrast 
to the latter, employees have no automatic right to part-time early retirement, 
since the employer must agree. Moreover, in the public sector, part-time VUT 
for civil servants is used to reduce staff costs and unemployment and to 
rejuvenate personnel. About one half of potential participants actually take up 
this option. The effective take-up rate of part-time VUT schemes in the private 
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sector is lower: about 10 to 15 per cent (Delsen, 1989; Heemskerk, 1994). In 
1992 and 1993 part-time VUT schemes were introduced into carpentry factories, 
the textile industry and contract catering. In 1994 a number of new schemes 
were set up under collective agreements, concluded inter alia in various 
wholesale and retail trade branches. 
Attitudes to work and retirement 
Approximately one quarter of older workers in the Netherlands would be 
willing to leave work at the age of 60, even if this meant a 30 per cent drop 
in net income. There is also considerable supply-side potential for gradual 
retirement. Of those already retired, 27 per cent would have taken part-time 
early retirement (i.e. have reduced their normal work hours by half), 51 per 
cent would have refused, and 22 per cent did not know. Of pre-early retirees, 
38 per cent would have taken up part-time early retirement, 46 per cent would 
not have and 16 per cent did not know (Henkens and Siegers, 1992). 
Pensions and social security 
Social security benefits and finance 
The General Disability Benefit Act (AAw) entitles all disabled persons previously 
gainfully employed up to the age of 65, to a basic flat-rate benefit derived from 
the net social minimum. Costs are charged to the Government. The Disability 
Security Act (wAo) covers all privately employed up to the age of 65 and, from 
the end of the first year of illness until, if need be, the age of 65, and provides 
for a benefit which depends on the previous earnings and the degree of disabil-
ity. Benefits under the wAo supplement AAW benefits. The maximum benefit, 
paid monthly, is 70 per cent of the previous wage, where 80-100 per cent 
disability is established. Conversely, that benefit can never fall below the legal 
net minimum wage. In 1993 the marginal WAO premium paid by employees was 
11.75 per cent. Partially disabled persons who are unsuccessful in finding 
employment commensurate with their ability are entitled under the ww to 
supplementary unemployment benefit. After lapse of the ww entitlement period, 
the partially disabled would revert to wealth-tested national assistance if their 
household incomes failed to reach the social minimum. In order to mitigate the 
effects of wealth-testing, considered unduly harsh for partially disabled or unem-
ployed workers, the Act on Income Provision for Older and Partially Disabled 
Workers (IOAW) was introduced. It provides financial assistance to older long-
term unemployed for whom the maximum period of entitlement to ww and 
follow-up benefits has expired. The IOA w is primarily intended for persons who, 
at the time of becoming unemployed, are between 50 and 57.5 years old. It, 
in addition, applies to those employees aged 57.5 and older who meet the '26 
weeks requirement' but not the '3 out of 5 requirement' stipulated by the ww 
(see below). The IOAW is a publicly financed facility. 
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Following a change in 1990 in the Unemployment Act (ww), persons who 
have worked for at least 26 weeks in the 12 months prior to unemployment are 
entitled to ww benefits (70 per cent of the daily wage) for six months. In order 
to claim benefit for longer than 6 months, those concerned must have received 
a salary for at least 52 weeks during three of the five calendar years prior to 
the year in which unemployment occurred (the '3 out of 5 requirement'). The 
duration of the benefit (to a maximum of 5 years) moreover depends on the 
number of years worked. At the end of the period for which the benefit can 
be drawn, persons who are still unemployed receive a follow-up benefit for a 
further year. Unemployment insurance is financed on a tripartite basis. 
Pension system 
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars (Besseling, 1994; Dekkers 
et al., 1994 ). The first pillar is the state-run General Old Age Act (A ow) under 
which a pay-as-you-go financed scheme has been established. Contributions 
(14 per cent in 1993) are levied up to a ceiling on taxable income. For two 
partners it provides a flat-rate pension benefit approximately equal to the legal 
net minimum wage from the age of 65 (for a single person 70 per cent of that 
wage). This is a compulsory old age pension for all residents. In principle the 
gross minimum wage follows the index of average negotiated wages. But 
because elements of the wage drift (incidental wage increase) are not included 
in this index, the adjustment mechanism plays an important role in limiting the 
future burden of statutory pensions. Moreover, this linkage has to some extent 
been abolished. Between 1980 and 1994 growth in the net AOW pension lagged 
19 per cent behind that of the gross wage. Furthermore, the fact that pensions 
and the minimum wage are linked on a net basis, has contributed to controlled 
expansion of pension expenditure. 
The second pillar is made up of quasi-private pension schemes. These 
schemes supplement AOW provision and are the responsibility of the social 
partners. However, the state provides both a legal framework and fiscal 
support. The law stipulates that supplementary pension schemes must be 
funded. In general, employers contribute 50 per cent or more. There are 82 
branch pension funds in industry and 1,058 company pension funds. These 82 
funds are members of the Association of branch pension funds. In addition, 
over 20,000 companies provide insured pension plans for (some of) their 
employees and 9 professional occupational pension schemes for self employed 
such as doctors and chemists (Pierik, 1991). The Insurance Board, a private 
agency, is vested with the authority to supervise pension funds. A separate law 
makes participation in the branch pension fund compulsory for all businesses. 
A company can opt-out only if it establishes a company scheme with a level 
of provision that exceeds that of the branch funds. 
Of employees aged 24-64 years 82 per cent are covered by a supplementary 
pension scheme; 72 per cent of these participate in a final-pay scheme; 15 per 
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cent in an average (median) pay scheme, 5 per cent in a modified fmal-pay 
scheme (combination of the first two) and 7 per cent in a scheme providing a 
flat-rate benefit. Only 0.6 per cent participate in a defmed contribution (avail-
able premium) scheme (Bezemer, 1991; Besseling, 1994). The AOW benefit 
included, the final pay schemes promise a maximum gross benefit equal to 70 
per cent of the last gross income earned, provided contributions have been paid 
in full over 40 years (1.75 per cent per year is tax-exempt). Employees who 
have enjoyed only temporary employment and those who have frequently. 
changed jobs suffer pension loss. Because the benefit itself is not related to the 
size of the contribution payments these pension rights are not fully portable. 
External labour mobility is thus hampered. Privately operated funds may refuse 
to take over obligations from each other, when a worker leaves one job and 
begins to contribute to another fund. As a result, mobility of workers is 
penalised with considerable loss of future income and accumulated pension 
rights. However, since mobility within a given branch is the norm, the branch-
wise organisation of pension funds tends not to affect mobility adversely. 
Moreover, as of 8 July 1994, employees who switch jobs are entitled to have 
their accrued pension claims transferred to the pension fund of the new 
employer. From that date also, part-timers may no longer be excluded from 
pension provision, a measure which is of importance to almost all working 
women in the Netherlands, since most work part-time. Previously, over one 
third were excluded from the coverage of private pension arrangements. Should 
a minimum-wage threshold exist, the wage of the part-timer is recalculated to 
the full-time wage. There is, moreover, the condition that the pension claims 
of the part-timer are pro rata those of the full-timer. 
Internal labour mobility is also hampered. Many supplementary schemes 
simply do not allow older workers to step back in their careers. The ABP, 
however, the biggest Dutch pension fund, is an exception. A cut (knip) in the 
workload may be requested when the salary goes down by more than 5 per cent, 
because of demotion or change in function. The building up of pension rights 
is divided into two parts. Given the defined benefits structure, i.e. the final pay 
base of most semi-private pension schemes, a relative decrease in AOW benefits 
results in an increase in supplementary pension benefits. Thus AOW is gradually 
being privatised. There is a trade-off (about one halt) between AOW premiums 
and premiums for supplementary pensions (Petersen, 1989). 
Pension benefits only are taxed, supplementary pension contributions and 
interest income from pension funds being tax-exempt. The latter is not the case 
for contributions to the basic pension. A gradual privatisation of the AOW implies 
a loss of tax revenues. Pensioners enjoy a special low rate of income tax and 
are not required to contribute to the pension scheme. The wedge on labour 
income has increased steadily, while that on retirement income has risen only 
very little. Consequently, a 70 per cent final-pay scheme yields a net pension 
of approximately 85 per cent of the net final pay. The latter could be a reason 
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for limiting the coverage of supplementary schemes. Another reason could be 
the growing individualisation of Dutch society. For example, regarding to 
household types, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) sees the following trends 
between 1990 and 2015. The proportion of singles without children will increase 
from 31 to 43 per cent, partly due to aging; the proportion of households with 
a partner and a child will decrease from 37 to 26 per cent. The uniform 70 per 
cent-final pay system for all employees has obviously been designed for the 
standard breadwinner with a house-keeping spouse. In an individualistic society 
there will be a greater call for flexible supplementary pension schemes suited 
to an individual's circumstances. An average pay scheme would be more appro-
priate. Contributions under the present system are a function of current wages, 
and benefits of last earned wages. This results in uncertainty about the reserves 
necessary to cover pension claims, excessive reserves being almost inevitable 
for most pension funds. Reducing costs means abolishing the final-pay system 
(Pierik, 1991; Besseling, 1994). 
Demographic developments in the Netherlands would seem to indicate that 
by the year 2035 a doubling of the contribution rate is to be expected. In its 
advice to the Government, the Drees Commission (1987) proposed the follow-
ing main changes: reduction of the AOW benefit for singles from 70 per cent 
to 50 per cent of the net minimum wage; raising the retirement age to 66 years 
and increasing AOW premiums paid by those 65 years and older. The Com-
mission concluded that either the purchasing power of pension benefits will be 
reduced by half or that the premiums will have to be raised (doubled) after 
2000. The Government concluded that the finance of the AOW is guaranteed 
and therefore no action is necessary! 
The third pillar consists of the voluntary pension arrangements individuals 
have organised for themselves. The premiums paid are not part of the wedge; 
personal provision has a neutral effect on the labour market. Individual pension 
schemes are financed by definition on a funding basis (Besseling, 1994; 
Gosling, 1994) and enable individuals to create their own additions to the first 
two pillars. 
Conclusions 
Unemployment, early retirement and disability are significant causes of early 
termination of active careers by older workers (aged 55 and over) in the 
Netherlands. These three phenomena function as communicating vessels. At 
present Dutch employer organisations are in favour of abolishing the VUT 
scheme, while trade unions favour extending it, for example, making it avail-
able to workers with 40 or more years of service. Abolishing VUT will inevi-
tably increase the pressure on disability and/or unemployment benefits. In a 
number of sectors, in attempts to remove full VUT altogether so as to make 
early retirement more flexible and thereby more affordable, part-time VUT and 
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partial and flexible pensions have recently been introduced. However, the take-
up rate has been low because of the continuing existence of generous full early 
retirement options. On the supply side, there is, indeed, considerable potential 
for gradual retirement. 
With a view to increasing the labour market position of older workers, the 
Dutch Government has taken various measures, including the removal of age 
discrimination from redundancy settlements and the PES policy. As the AOW 
gradually becomes privatised, supplementary pensions, and hence funding, will 
become increasingly important. The latter will act as a stimulus to gradual 
retirement. The replacement of the final-pay by an average-pay system will 
promote gradual retirement, and thus the participation rates of older workers, 
control the costs of the supplementary pension schemes and favour age-specific 
personnel management. Moreover the linkage with prices instead of with wages 
is more in line with the trend towards individualisation in pension provision. 
New public policies 
Pension reform 
In consultation with employer and employee organisations the Kok-van Mierlo 
Government is searching for ways to encourage greater flexibility and variety 
in work patterns, including changes in work hours, through the entire pro-
fessional life-cycle (szw, 1994). Based on reports by the Drees Commission 
(1987) and the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 
1990; 1993), the Government is examining ways of broadening the basis of 
Aow financing. The AOW will remain the basic pension since for some elderly 
it is the only source of income. In 1995 income-related tax-relief will be 
introduced for the latter category. As of 1996, in order to be able to guarantee 
AOW provision over the long term, in cases where one of the partners is 
younger than 65 years, the Government feels it will be reasonable to provide 
the AOW supplement only when the family income is below the social mini-
mum. The fact that part of the AOW benefit is to be made conditional on, for 
example, a supplementary pension, implies that the AOW will take on a supple-
mentary role, while the supplementary pension becomes the basis. Other 
measures to be taken are: a higher threshold for ww, privatisation of the 
Sickness Act and the introduction of the market process into its operation 
through opting out, and premiums differentiation in the w AO. 
According to the Government, gradual exit from work is more in accord 
with individual freedom of choice and societal development. In so far as is 
possible, obstacles to work after 65 years will be removed, and this will 
require 'customising' social security in some measure and giving greater 
flexibility to pensioning. Gradually. there will be less room for vtrr arrange-
ments, because of the too low level of labour participation of older employees 
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(szw, 1994). Although flexible pensioning has been cited as an alternative to 
VUT, there has been no research into the cost consequences of such a scheme, 
and one may wonder whether such a scheme will promote the labour participa-
tion of older workers. It seems that the Government is seeking an alternative 
to VUT, in order to check the shift to ww and WAO benefits. Current exit routes 
and practice have to change to make remaining in employment relatively 
attractive (see Trammel, 1993). It should be noted, however, that the supple-
mentary pension and the VUT schemes are the responsibility of the social 
partners, and that the Government has no direct control over them. 
In response to the WRR's 1993 report, the Government has stated its convic-
tion that, in view of the changes in the age structure of the work force, a 
different wage profile is needed. For instance, a higher wage at the beginning 
of a career, when productivity is highest, and a relatively lower wage at the 
end. However, the notion that productivity decreases with age remains no more 
than a prejudice since it has not been empirically established (see below). This 
change would also entail a change in the pension accruing. In the matter of 
supplementary pensions, the Dutch government is in favour of average-pay to 
replace final-pay schemes, because of the digressive intergenerational redis-
tribution of income. It, moreover, advocates that consumer price indexation 
replace wage indexation (Tweede Kamer, 1991). The legal frame work for 
supplementary pensions has recently been adopted in order to make pensions 
more flexible and to ease the replacement of the expensive VUT by pre-pension 
schemes. Full and partial drawing of pensions is possible between the age of 
55 and 70. Tax exemption is raised from 1.75 per cent to 2 per cent per year. 
The absolute benefit maximum of 70 per cent is abolished; the new maximum 
is 100 per cent of gross final pay. As of the year 2000 the partner pension can 
be exchanged for a higher individual pension. 
Collective agreements on older workers 
As far as collective agreements on older workers are concerned, the latter 
confine themselves to age of ending the work contract, early retirement, extra 
days off and exemption from overtime or shift work. On the issues of employ-
ment and labour market position, recruitment and selection, personnel and job 
policy, training and social-medical prevention, most collective agreements to 
date are silent as far as older workers are concerned and focus mainly on 
corrective measures. In trade union policy since 1990 there has been a shift 
towards preventive measures, including training, gradual early retirement, task 
reduction and improvement of working conditions. Some trade unions, how-
ever, are against policies specific to the older worker (LTD, 1991; FNV, 1992). 
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7.2 Micro issues and policies 
Recent ti"ends 
Work performance 
Dutch research on age and productivity is limited. Van Heeringen (1983) found 
the notion that the productivity of researchers decreases with age not to be 
based on empirical grounds, but on - largely implicit - supposition. It is 
impossible to estimate the influence of age on the level of productivity; 
although one could, at the very outside, test to what extent age influences 
changes in productivity. The growth rate of productivity is higher before 30 
than after that age. Based on cross-sectional data, Gelderblom and de Koning 
(1992) found that productivity is highest for those between 40 and 45 years. 
The productivity of employees aged 60 and over with the same level of formal 
education is 45 per cent lower. 
Company pension regulations 
Part-time VUT schemes have recently been introduced at Ahold (a retail corpor-
ation) and the Dutch Railways (Ns) . The Ahold scheme links age with the level 
of the benefit and the extent of the work time reduction. Ns has a two step 
part-time vuT scheme, placed upstream of its full VUT scheme. Several other 
bigger Dutch enterprises (Buehrmann Tetterode; osM; ESso; KLM) have recently 
introduced a flexible pension age. At Akzo Nobel, Heidemij and Wavin the 
current VUT schemes will gradually be replaced by pension schemes. At Akzo 
Nobel, this operation has to be completed by the year 2005. Early retirement 
is financed from an individual's personal savings or by an early drawing of the 
supplementary pension. One third of the saving on VUT expenditure is used to 
introduce an activating elderly policy and two thirds go straight to the 
employees. Employees have the right to partial retirement between 60 and 65 
years but for pension purposes, in order to supplement their wage, must draw 
upon their own supplementary schemes. At Heidemij (starting in 1997) flexible 
and partial pensioning will be possible from 55 years onwards. The net benefit 
is 85 per cent of the last salary for those completing 40 years of service. The 
savings on vUT are used to finance the new scheme, additional premiums being 
paid by the employer. At Wavin (1994), employees may retire fully or partially 
as of the age of 55, depending on the pension rights accrued. The schemes at 
Buehrmann Tetterode and Wavin are tailor-made 'cafeteria' systems. The menu 
includes the following options: supplementary leave, overtime pay, profit 
shares, changing yearly benefit and the choice of the retirement age (Ten Brink 
and Delsen, 1993; Heemskerk, 1994). All these schemes guarantee a benefit 
equal to a given percentage of the final pay. In none of these schemes is the 
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option to retire after the pension age (between 65 and 70 years) explicitly 
mentioned. 
Age discrimination 
Not only does age discrimination occur in the recruitment of personnel, but 
there is also age-based selectivity in cases of dismissal. Dutch employers apply 
age ceilings for personnel recruitment purposes (De Vroom and Blomsma, 
1991). When firms reorganise, the reduction of personnel follows a certain 
pattern (LTD, 1992). Older workers (55 years and over) are the first to go in 
line with existing legal regulations and with specific provisions at the enter-
prise or branch levels. Redundancy or dismissal is, in most cases, based on 
age, number of years in service, pension and early retirement rights and the 
nature of the contract. In at least 70 per cent of enterprises the legal social 
benefit for unemployment as well as disability is supplemented up to 100 per 
cent of the last wage. The level and duration of the supplement almost always 
depend on age and seniority. In one half of cases the pension is supplemented, 
and in about 25 per cent of enterprises the vuT benefit is supplemented (see 
also Bolweg and Dijkstra, 1993; Trommel and de Vroom, 1994). Kerkhoff 
(1981) concludes that Dutch firms seldom recognise the specific problems of 
older workers, and rarely develop strategies to integrate them. In fact, it was 
the existence of vtrr and the WAO as exit routes that stimulated firms to imple-
ment an exit strategy rather than devise new age-specific social policies. Dutch 
employers seek to reduce personnel at least possible cost. But employees have 
proved well able to defend their cause and this has resulted in high costs with 
w AO still a major exit route. Dutch employers are not in any hurry to abolish 
vtrr, because they view it as an integral part of a broader strategy for down-
sizing their organisation (Bolweg and Dijkstra, 1993). Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that these exit routes are mainly used for or by unskilled blue-collar 
workers and middle white-collar workers, with top-level employees normally 
opting to stay on (WRR, 1990; De Vroom and Blomsma, 1991). For employees 
with relatively little qualification the major exit route is disability, while for 
the more highly educated early retirement is the preferred route. Abolishing 
vtrr will thus mean different things for different categories of worker (Henkes 
and Siegers, 1992; Gelderblom and de Koning, 1992). 
New company policies 
Personnel policy 
A survey of 760 firms in 1990 (LTD, 1991) shows that 9 per cent of firms with 
older (55+) workers on the payroll take the physical loadability of such 
workers into account. In building 25 per cent of firms, in industry 12 per cent 
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and in road transport 18 per cent do this. Only 2 per cent of enterprises with 
older people on the payroll apply a deliberate policy for the task loading of 
older workers. The larger the firm the greater the likelihood that age-manage-
ment policies will exist: 28 per cent indicated an ad hoc policy, 70 per cent 
stated that older workers are not considered because of the nature of the firm 
or because of function requirements, 29 per cent of those surveyed indicated 
that they use the knowledge and experience of older workers. This was particu-
larly true of the building sector (50 per cent) and to a lesser extent of trade 
and hotel and catering (16 per cent). There is an age-limit (on average 56 
years) on shift work and irregular shifts in one fifth of the enterprises. This 
does not apply in the building sector, while it does in 42 per cent of the firms 
surveyed in the banking sector. In 23 per cent of enterprises there is also an 
age limit on overtime. But more recent experience in the Netherlands in the 
matter of age-specific personnel management would suggest a new trend: a 
tempering of existing policy instruments on age and more generally a change 
in thinking about the employment of older workers. Van der Kloet et al. 
(1994) found that employer-employee talks about job functions play an impor-
tant role in age-specific personnel management. Such discussions are deemed 
valuable in the reallocation of functions to suit the loadability of end-of-career 
workers. Information gleaned from such talks also serves as a basis for the 
formulation' of careers and training policy. 
Pay policy 
In addition to prejudice about senior employees generally, the pay system is 
itself an obstacle to labour participation of older workers. Wages increase with 
age. Before 45 years wages are below productivity, and after 45 years above 
(Gelderblom and de Koning, 1992). Young workers are, in fact, subsidising the 
higher wages of older workers. In one sense there is nothing wrong with such 
a system. It acts as an incentive to higher productivity and to greater loyalty 
to the firm. However, the system begins to cause problems when, due to 
greying, the average age of the work force increases. The expensive older 
worker is then off-loaded. Gelderblom et al. (1994) also found that the produc-
tivity/wage ratio is unfavourable to older workers. Jacobs (1985) concluded 
that, for young employees, wages increase relatively fast. As the worker grows 
older, first the rate of wage increase diminishes, then the wage is static and 
finally shows a slight decline. 
Demotion, redesign of work and job rotation 
Age is often considered an independent cause of employment situation prob-
lems. However, wastage and exhaustion may also result from inappropriate 
loading and from monotonous and repetitive work. Kerkhoff (1981) argues that 
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a more dynamic placement and allocation policy, in combination with training 
and schooling opportunities, will certainly increase costs, such costs, however, 
will in time be repaid by an increase in willingness to change and a broader 
skills package. Recent research in the Netherlands seems to confirm this. 
Function adjustment, through a reshuffling of tasks within a given job or 
function to include less burdensome ones, is a crucial part of the individual 
career policies that can be used to prevent drop-out and reduce sick leave. 
Employees value this as positive, and organisations have found it a useful 
source of knowledge and experience. Social motives also play a role. If 
stigmatisation is to be avoided, changes in tasks and functions should not be 
presented as career alternatives for older workers only; length of the service 
should be the initial criterion. In addition, collective function readjustment may 
be used to achieve a more favourable balance between work-load and load-
ability at the department level, and may include rotation of functions and the 
broadening of personnel deployment. Both the latter have proved successful in 
reducing sick leave and in promoting change and enrichment in the work 
place. The broader deployment of staff can also contribute to a more effective 
organisation of work. Change and improvement in work conditions is one 
important way of keeping employees healthily active until the normal retire-
ment age. Work conditions include safety, health and wellbeing but also how 
these are perceived by older workers. Giving proper attention to these factors 
improves motivation and the self confidence of employees (Van der Kloet et 
al., 1994). Gelderblom et al. (1994) conclude that regular function adjustment 
as well as job-changing Gob-hopping) in a career will preserve the productivity 
of employees. The decreasing mobility of older employees within a company 
leads to static behaviour in which they increasingly regard their function as a 
final stage rather than a springboard for keeping up with change in the 
organisation (Kamstra and Van de Craats, 1992). It may be concluded that it 
is not age, but performing the same task year in year out that is the main cause 
of diminished productivity. 
Part-time work 
In the Netherlands, all sectors of industry practice what are known as 'seniors' 
days: an increase in the number of holidays for older workers (LTD, 1991). For 
those aged 55 years, 3 days (in commerce 2 days and in building 6 days), for 
those aged 64, almost 5 days (in building 9 days and in road transport 3 days). 
Part-time employment is also practiced, i.e. an individual reduction in work 
time at one's own expense is used for older workers as of a certain age (see 
table 7.4). In the building sector part-time employment for older workers does 
not exist. In road transport a tiny number of enterprises (1 per cent) offer 
gradual retirement. Even so, in such firms 9 per cent of employees use this 
option. This may be explained by the fact that part-time is used in certain large 
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Table 7.4 
Reduction in working time of older workers by sector of activity 
in enterprises with older workers on the payroll 
Sector of Enterprises Average age Older employees 
activity with favourable ceiling for with reduced 
working working time working time 
conditions reduction 
Industry 7% 60.3 3% 
Building 0% 0% 
Trade/hotel and catering 7% 59.1 10% 
Road transport 1% 56.9 9% 
Banking/commercial services 35% 60.7 8% 
Other services 22% 58.2 10% 
Average 11% 59.5 7% 
Source: LTD, 1991. 
enterprises employing many older workers. The reverse is true of banking and 
commerce and of other service sectors. In many enterprises, even though such 
part-time options are on offer, few older employees make use of them. In 
small (<10 employees) businesses, 10 per cent of older workers retire gradual-
ly. 
Table 7.5 
Participation of employees in internal and external courses by age, 
1988-1992, in the Netherlands 
Age 1988-1990 
Internal External 
16-29 
30-44 
45-64 
Source: OSA, Trendrapport, 1993. 
Training 
22 
21 
16 
29 
20 
10 
1990-1992 
Internal External 
25 
25 
19 
36 
21 
9 
There is evidence that training contributes to labour mobility and productivity. 
Table 7.5 shows an increase in the participation of employees in courses since 
1990 and reveals that older employees, relative to their younger colleagues, are 
less likely to be considered for supplementary training. However, participation 
in internal courses by older workers has increased over recent years. Other 
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Dutch research shows, nonetheless, that participation in training by older em-
ployees is still low, notably by the less educated and those employed in smaller 
units (Kamstra and Vander Craats, 1991; Gelderblom and de Koning, 1992). 
The LTD (1991) survey also shows that, relative to younger employees (11 per 
cent), older employees are underrepresented (7 per cent) in courses and training. 
Most of the training is aimed at skills preservation so as better to be able to 
execute current functions and only a small part at retraining for new functions. 
Gelderblom and de Koning (1992) and Gelderblom et al. (1994) found that 
training has a greater positive impact on productivity than on wages. This 
confirms the view that training can be an important way of improving the 
functioning of senior workers, i.e. the productivity-wage ratio. There appears 
to be no difference in the productivity-enhancing effect of training courses as 
between seniors and other categories of worker. This is in line with other 
investigations into the relationship between age and 'learning capacity'. The 
latter does not decline with age, so long as the design of the training is suited 
to the needs of the senior citizen. Hence, form and content will influence its 
effectiveness. The 1992 study also shows that external courses have a greater 
effect on both wages and productivity than internal ones. They conclude that 
there exists a real potential for enhanced productivity, since, physical and 
notably mental faculties decline less with age than many people believe. 
Training within the company reduces the number of people dropping out on 
grounds of disability. Other recent research (Vander Kloet et al., 1994) shows 
that training is seen as a means of raising the quality of an employee's skills 
and hence the quaFty of the product. It increases the self confidence, motiva-
tion, flexibility and mobility of older workers. Recurring schooling and training 
promote the activity rate of older people and can avoid knowledge aging. 
Best practice in gradual retirement 
Of special interest is the funded gradual retirement scheme that has recently 
been agreed upon for the Harbours of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and which 
by 2010 will replace the present pay-as-you-go VUT scheme (Delsen, 1994). 
The harbours apply an average pay pension system, facilitating gradual retire-
ment. Resolution of the dilemma between flexibility and solidarity has been 
found in the co-existence of obligatory and voluntary modes of financing the 
basic supplementary pension and in a partial plugging of the AOW hole with 
early retirement, i.e. before the age 65. In this way, gradual retirement 
becomes a feasible option for all employees, including the lower paid. Two 
bridge options are available: additional finance through a temporary bridge 
pension split into a compulsory collective part (for those aged 63-65), 
employers paying 2/3, employees 1/3 of the premium, and a voluntary individual 
part (for those aged 60-62) borne fully by the individual worker. The annual 
premium for the collective bridge pension is 1 per cent from age 21 to age 62; 
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for the individual bridge pension 3.6 per cent from 45 year to 60 years. The 
second option is partial pensioning to plug the AOW hole. The establishment of 
fully funded retirement provision takes 15 years, since for each benefit, prior 
to the first disbursement, the total present value has to be accumulated. A 
transitional scheme has been agreed upon to cover the period until effective 
introduction of the new system. Because both current VUT benefits have to be 
paid and future pension claims to be built up, there is a double premium 
burden. Over this period the VUT system will be progressively transformed into 
a gradual early retirement scheme, with the VUT benefit depending on the years 
of service, the age of exit and the number of hours of work-time reduction 
(full or partial retirement). In order to link up with the pension system the VUT 
benefit will be reduced to 70 per cent (now 90 per cent) of gross final pay. 
Over this transition period also, part-time employment is to be promoted by 
these financial incentives so as to keep income at a certain level should the 
years of service be too few. In order to safeguard the vuT, funds can be created 
to which both employee and employer contribute. Flanking policies for older 
workers, including function content, work time and periods of work, and 
training and retraining are to be an integral part of the reform towards a 
gradual retirement scheme. The aim of this policy is to keep the employee 
motivated until retirement age. Lightening the mental and physical burden on 
the individual worker is also expected to reduce disability leave. 
7.3 Potential for gradual retirement and recommendations 
A flexible retirement age contributes more to postponing retirement than does 
increasing the AOW age. The latter will result in savings on AOW and supple-
mentary pensions, but recourse to VUT and WAO will increase. And since WAO 
and VUT benefits are higher, an adverse effect may be expected. This measure 
will only be effective if at the same time early exit routes are drastically 
reduced. In addition, those without supplementary benefits will lean more on 
other collective services. Flexible pensioning may, moreover, take into account 
differences between individuals and sectors. Judgements about the present 
linkage, levying premium on income above Aow (basic pension) and increasing 
the AOW age, are political ones (WRR, 1993). However, most believe that it is 
in the field of supplementary pensions that the real problems will occur. 
Previous sections have suggested a considerable potential for gradual 
retirement in the Netherlands. For current older workers it is too late to 
introduce individual early retirement saving schemes and training programmes. 
For the short term, then, two options remain open: partial vUT and the possibil-
ity of changing function within the firm, the idea being in both instances that 
more appropriate use be made of the experience and capacities of the older 
employees. 
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A more permanent solution can be found in an individualised gradual 
retirement scheme enabling full and partial early as well as full and partial 
deferred retirement - by integrating the VUT and pension schemes and by 
introducing funding to replace the pay-as-you-go system (Delsen, forthcoming). 
In the Netherlands, supplementary pensions are financed by funding. Moreover, 
bearing in mind the 'greying' of the labour force, funding is desirable as a 
means of financing the various sectoral VUT schemes. A shift from pay-as-you-
go towards funding will make it possible to retain the present pension level 
and pension age, and at the same time avoid a too high burden on the future 
active labour force due to the aging process. The link between premiums paid 
and entitlements will be tighter, creating an incentive to work more years, 
meaning that an early pension will imply an actuarial reduction, while working 
more years will imply a higher pension. It will, moreover, make the labour 
market more flexible, because, with funding, pension rights are portable, while 
pay-as-you-go financed vuT rights are not. The job mobility of older workers 
will increase, and the future unpaid bill will be avoided. Such a link will also 
be better suited to a labour force that is becoming increasingly heterogeneous 
and where variety in employment contracts, reflecting, in particular, part-time 
employment and other atypical employment relations, is rapidly becoming the 
norm in the Netherlands. The impact of recent changes in the pension system 
and the fiscal support on gradual retirement is still unclear. If the full benefit 
of the potential advantages is to be enjoyed, final-pay pension schemes will 
need to be replaced by average-pay schemes. Only in this way will older 
workers avoid the otherwise detrimental consequences of gradual retirement 
from the labour process. Net savings on pension expenditure will be the result. 
Indexation based on consumer prices instead of on wages will afford additional 
future savings. Moreover, the discrepancy between pay and performance of 
older workers could be narrowed by flexible pay systems and training facil-
ities, with the latter being partly financed from savings on VUT benefits. An 
age-related personnel policy could offset the changing capacities of age-groups 
through investment in permanent education, to keep the human capital intact 
throughout working life. Such steps have yet to be taken in the Netherlands. 
The gradual greying of the work force will ensure that taken they are. 
References 
Aarts, L.J.M. and Ph.R. de Jong (1992), Economic Aspects of Disability Behaviour, North 
Holland, Amsterdam. 
Besseling, P.J. (1994), 'Pensions, Savings and the Labour Market in the Netherlands' in 
Bovenberg, A.L. (ed.), pp. 41-66. 
Bezemer, P.J. (1991), 'Protecting One's Pension Rights when Changing or Losing One's 
Job' in Schmahl, W. (ed.), pp. 227-234. 
Gradual retirement in the Netherlands 131 
Bolweg, J.F. and J.H. Dijkstra (1993), Vervroegd Uittreden of Ouderenbeleid, OSA-werk-
document W 112, Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag. 
Bovenberg, A.L. (ed.) (1994), The Economics of Pensions: The Case of the Netherlands, 
Papers and Proceedings 9401, Research Centre for Economic Policy, Rotterdam. 
Brink, N. ten, and L. Delsen (1993),/nventarisatie vanjlexibele pensioen- en VUTregelin-
gen, Vakgroep Toegepaste Economie, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, Nijmegen. 
DCA (1992-1994), CAO-.afspraken 1992-1994, Dienst Collectieve Arbeidsvoorwaarden, 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Den Haag. 
Dekkers, G.J.M. et al. (1994), 'Reform in the Dutch Pension System' in Bovenberg, A.L. 
(ed.), pp. 67-80. 
Delsen, L. (1989), Deeltijd-VUT in Europa, osA-werkdocument W 60, Organisatie voor 
Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag. 
Delsen, L. (1993), Managing Redundancies in the Netherlands. National Economic and 
Labour Council, CNEL Rome. 
Delsen, L. (1994), 'Geleidelijke uittreding uit het Arbeidsproces', Sociaal Maandblad 
Arbeid, 49, pp. 609-617. 
Delsen, L. (1995), Atypical Employment: An International Perspective. Causes, Conse-
quences and Policy, Wolters-Noordhoff, Groningen. 
Del sen, L. (forthcoming), 'Gradual Retirement: Lessons from the Nordic Countries and the 
Netherlands', European Journal of Industrial Relations. 
Delsen, L. and S. Klosse (1992), 'Integration of the Disabled in the Work Process: The 
Dutch Policy', The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 17, pp. 119-142. 
Drees Commission (1987), Gespiegeld in de tijd, de AOW in de toekomst, Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Den Haag. 
FNV (1992), Werk en ouder worden. 50 Plus en arbeidsvoorwaarden, Federatie Neder-
landse Vakbeweging, Amsterdam. 
Gelderblom, A. and J. de Koning (1992), Meerjarig, minderjarig, een onderzoek naar de 
invloed van leeftijd op produktiviteit en beloning, OSA Voorstudie 39, Organisatie voor 
Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag. 
Gelderblom, A., N.B.J.G. 't Hoen and J. de Koning (1994), Beloning en produktiviteit, osA 
Voorstudie 120, Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag. 
Goslings, J.H.W. (1994), 'The Structure of Pension Benefits and Investment Behaviour' 
in Bovenberg, A.L. (ed.), pp. 25-39. 
Heernskerk, C.A.M. (1994), Flexibel en geleidelijk met pensioen: een onderzoek naar de 
mogelijkheden, Voorlopige Raad voor het Ouderenbeleid, Rijswijk. 
Heeringen, A. Van (1983), Relaties tussen leeftijd, mobiliteit en produktiviteit van weten-
schappelijke onderzoekers, Den Haag. 
Henkens, K. and J. Siegers (1992), Vrijwillige vervroegde uittreding, osA-werkdocument 
W 102, Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag. 
Jacobs, H. (1985), De loonstructuur, analyse van verschillen in beloning tussen werk-
nemers in het bedrijfsleven, Groningen. 
Kamstra, E. and W. van der Craats (1991), Eenrichtingsverkeer op de arbeidsmarkt, osA-
werkdocument W 91, Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek, Den Haag. 
Kerkhoffs, W .H. C. (1981), Ouder worden, verouderen en het personeelsbeleid, Universiteit 
van Amsterdam, Amsterdam. 
Kloet, H.T. van der, A. Sikkema and R.Ch. Boom (1994), Leeftijdsbewust personeelsbeleid 
in bedrijf. Praktijkervaringen van tien bedrijven en organisaties, Commissie Ontwikke-
Jing Bedrijven, Sociaal-Economische Raad, Den Haag. 
LTD (1991), Ouderenbeleid in arbeidsorganisaties, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, Den Haag. 
132 Lei Delsen 
LTD (1992), Sociale plannen bij reorganisaties, Loontechnische Dienst, Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Den Haag. 
Petersen, C. ( 1989), Economie en pensioenen, Stenfert Kroese, Leiden. 
Pierik, J.B.M. (1991), 'The Dutch Perspective' in Schmahl, W. (ed.), pp. 152-160. 
Schmahl, W. (ed.) (1991), The Future of Basic and Supplementary Pension Schemes in 
the European Community-1992 and beyond, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 
szw (1994), Sociale Nota 1994, 1995, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 
Den Haag. 
Trommel, W. (1993), Eigentijds met pensioen, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgele-
genheid, Den Haag. 
Trommel, W. and B. de Vroom (1994), 'The Netherlands: The Loreley-Effect of Early 
Retirement' in Naschold, F. and B. de Vroom (eds.), Regulating Employment and 
Welfare. Company and National Policies of Labour Force Participation at the End of 
Worklife in Industrial Countries (pp. 51-115), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin. 
Tweede Kamer (1991), Pensioennota, Vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 22167, no. I, Den Haag. 
Vroom, B. de, and M. Blomsma (1991), 'The Netherlands: An Extreme Case' in Kohli, 
M., M. Rein, A. Guillemard and H. van Gunsteren (eds.), Time for Retirement. Com-
parative Studies of Early Exit from the Labor Force, (pp. 97-126) Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge. 
WRR ( 1990), Een werkend perspectief Arbeidsparticipatie in de jaren '90, Rapporten aan 
de Regering 38, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Den Haag. 
WRR (1993), Ouderen voor ouderen. Demografische ontwikkelingen en beleid, Rapporten 
aan de Regering 43, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Den Haag. 
